Abstract: Does the Brazilian presidential system shape environmental policy there? The comparative literature on environmental policy offers few reasons to think that it might. Most explanations of variations in the quantity and quality of environmental regulation stress levels of economic development or move outside of the nation-state to examine international processes of diffusion and convergence. Other studies look at large macrostructural differences like the contrast between democratic and authoritarian systems and/or the role of non-state actors. This article examines environmental policies and outcomes in three successive presidential administrations in Brazil to develop hypotheses about whether institutional factors should gain a larger place in comparative studies of environmental policies and outcomes.
Introduction
What factors explain policy outcomes in different issue areas? This special issue focuses on Brazil and spotlights the possible role of presidentialism -both the generic institution and its Brazilian variants -in answering this question. The basic logic stresses that presidentialism gives a single individual a great deal of power and democratic legitimacy. Especially when presidential systems, like Brazil's, lack significant checks and balances from other branches of government, this should produce policy outcomes that closely follow the president's own public policy agenda and/or that of the coalition partners on whom the president relies. Translated into an expectation for environmental policy, the focus of this article, it suggests that environmental policies and outcomes may well shift quite a bit with incoming administrations. The shifts should be traceable to presidents' visions and their governing strategies.
These expectations are quite different from those of most studies of comparative environmental policy. In those, the most common drivers of environmental policy are found outside of national political institutions and individuals. Scholars often identify levels of economic development as a critical line of delineation (Sommerer and Lim 2016: 93-94) or focus on the presence of democracy versus authoritarianism (Midlarsky 1998 ). Environmental policy is also often thought to follow its own dynamics of expansion through international diffusion and adoption processes (e.g., Duit 2016) . While authors stress that backtracking is possible, the general image is of a complex policy area that normally accretes policies in a cumulative way over time that is less responsive to changes of administration than to technical developments and the pushing of non-state actors from scientists to activists (Fahey and Pralle 2016) .
The next section of the article develops these expectations further, with particular reference to Brazil. After this, I examine the environmental policy area in three recent presidential administrations there: President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva's first (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) and second (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) terms and President Dilma Rousseff's first term (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) . I
show that each of these terms did have a markedly different character in terms of environmental policy and outcomes, although the differences among the Ministers of Environment were as important as those among the Presidents themselves. At the same time, it is not clear that the scale of the differences would register in many comparative studies of environmental politics, suggesting a disjuncture between the analytical aims of these two kinds of policy studies. I return to this point in the conclusion.
Presidents and Policy: A Review with Reference to Environmental Policy
As just noted, most comparative discussions of environmental policy do not envision a significant explanatory role for institutional dimensions like presidentialism.
In this policy area, many studies look beyond nation-states to emphasize global processes of diffusion and emulation (e.g., Duit 2016; Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000; Sommerer and Lim 2016: 94) . These studies often emphasize the role of leader institutions and international norms in spreading innovative regulatory frameworks. For example, the World Bank helped to disseminate practices like regular environmental impact assessment (EIA) of new economic projects (Wade 1997) . The technical quality of environmental policy, which relies heavily on scientific disciplines and agreed regulatory approaches (Haas 1990) , sets it apart from other issue areas, in this view. When scholars examine the national level, there is a strong presumption (albeit with inconclusive evidence) that levels of economic development are important for explaining environmental policy and outcomes (Fahey and Praline 2016: S32; Purdon 2015; Sommerer and Lim 2016: 93-94; Stern 2004 ). The evidence is inconclusive in part because so little research has been done outside the advanced industrial democracies. In terms of institutions, scholars have tended to look at quite broad institutional choices, like the impact of democracy versus authoritarianism in explaining environmental outcomes (Midlarsky 1998) . More specific institutional choices, like presidentialism versus parliamentarism, are not considered important. One recent review of the growth of environmental regulation, in fact, concluded that there was no overlap between "most other comparative classification schemes" and the level of national environmental commitment (Duit 2016: 87) and others agree (e.g., Houle, Lachapelle, and Purdon 2015; Scruggs 1999 ).
All of these approaches tend to see environmental policy as cumulative and linearly advancing -as values and models are diffused, as countries develop, when they become democratic -in a way that is hard to square with the presidentialism literature's image of policy arenas that are quickly responsive to the ambitions and coalition building strategies of individual presidents. Still, there is some possible basis for expecting the arrangements of presidentialism to matter, given the "political opportunity" approaches that have been widely used to explain the roles of non-state actors (e.g., Kitschelt 1986), since they are so important for the environmental issue area. In addition, almost all of the studies of institutions focus on the advanced industrialized democracies, and it is possible that such studies "reinforce assumptions about professionalized legislatures and bureaucracies that might not apply to less developed areas of the world" (Fahey and Praline 2016: S32), including Brazil.
In fact, most observers of Brazilian politics see a highly politicized bureaucracy and legislature there and an outsized role of the national president in shaping political outcomes. As the introduction to this special issue and its other papers show, the size of this role is in some ways derivative of the normal characteristics of presidential systems, since a directly elected head of state and government almost inevitably gains tremendous power and discretion. Heads of the bureaucracy serve at the pleasure of the president and so should be an especially direct transmission belt for presidential ambitions (Linz 1990 Brazil's dozens of programmatically weak political parties have required Brazilian presidents to be deft coalition managers, but -if they are -they can then use those coalitions to deliver their desired outcomes in first passing laws and then implementing them (Amorim Neto 2002; Figueiredo and Limongi 1999; Pereira, Power, and Renno 2005) . This would reinforce the expectation that policy should follow presidential visions in Brazil. A president strongly committed to environmental policy should be able to push new regulations and strengthen environmental institutions, while an uncommitted president might promote economic development at the expense of environmental protections and roll back environmental regulations and institutions.
Yet the coalitional basis of Brazilian presidentialism means that the environmental policy arena complicates governing for all presidents, even if they personally want to promote environmental protection. In Brazil's coalitional presidentialism, ministries are allocated to political parties in order to shore up their support for the political agenda of the president. Budgetary clientelism, or pork, is a complementary tool used for ongoing coalition management, as individuals are offered targeted benefits for their legislative support; a number of the parties that have made up most governing coalitions demand such pork for their support (Ames 2001; Mueller 2010: 112; Power 2010: 28-29; Raile, Pereira, and Power 2011: 324) . Yet the Ministry of Environment frequently delays or, more rarely, blocks the targeted infrastructure projects that are a favorite tool for rewarding legislative support (Amorim Neto and Simonassi 2013; Hochstetler and Tranjan 2016) . It may do so on its own or when prodded by environmental activists through protests or by working with actors like the Ministério Público, a powerful and independent public prosecutor. 
The National Environmental Bureaucracy and its Ministers
Brazil was one of the few Latin American countries to create a national environmental bureaucracy in the 1970s, in full military government. Long time conservationist Paulo Nogueira Neto was tapped to be the first Special Secretary of the Environment, serving from 1973 to 1985. The institution he led had just three employees and almost no budget at its origin, but immediately faced off with the most powerful ministries, of economics and foreign affairs (Hochstetler and Keck 2007: 27-29) . The national Secretariat also shared the policy space with both very strong (Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo) and notably weak (everywhere else) state agencies (Hochstetler and Keck 2007: 14-15) , as well as newly contentious environmental movements who even challenged cherished military projects (Antuniassi, Magdalena, and Giansanti 1989) .
All of these became hallmarks of the environmental policy area in Brazil. The number of personnel grew substantially -to 6230 employees by 1989 -but budgeted project spending was cut year after year (Hochstetler and Keck 2007: 36; 40-42) . From 1995 to 2002, not a single new position was advertised, and by the end of the period, most personnel and projects were handled with short-term contracts (Abers and Oliveira 2015: 17) . In a national budget that has many political and statutory rigidities, environmental spending is one of the few areas that can be cut to meet budget targets (Mueller 2010) . Even though the agency was raised to ministerial status as early as 1985, the institutions were reshuffled so frequently that little institutionalization was possible (Hochstetler and Keck 2007: 38-39) . The first Cardoso government added water resources to the portfolio to make it attractive to the PFL as a coalition partner, since water resources (90% of the ministry budget) held some scope for pork in the form of irrigation and other water projects (Abers and Oliveira 2015: 10) .
1 Once those parts were removed and the agency became simply the Ministry of Environment (Ministério do Meio Ambiente) in 1999, it settled into a more stable period as a second-line ministry, a minor part of the partisan horse-trading of coalition formation.
As a result of these developments, nearly all of the Ministers of the Environment have had significant environmental profiles before moving into the position, with more mixed partisan backgrounds. The last three occupants of the position are good illustrations of these dimensions of the environmental issue area. While two of them were members and elected politicians for the PT before they were appointed, they also have been associated with environmental parties and movements. activists had lobbied to have her as minister, and followed her to the ministry. They held 38% of Silva's leadership positions in the ministry, while 22% of the positions went to members of the PT (Abers and Oliveira 2015: 10, 19) . In short, Silva had strong environmental as well as partisan credentials to be the PT's first Minister of the Environment.
Silva is a proponent of the socioenvironmental claim that environmental aims can only be achieved with attention to social claims as well (Hochstetler and Keck 2007: 13; Viana, Silva, and Diniz 2001) . She was a particularly active and successful minister, placing special emphasis on the institutional foundations of the ministry and addressing deforestation (Abers and Oliveira 2015) . On the former, she worked to improve the environmental bureaucracy, creating a specialized environmental career path for public servants for the first time and hiring 1474 of them in five years through public competitions (Abers and Oliveira 2015: 17) . Silva also staunchly defended her technical staff against other ministries and the politicized environment of licensing. 2 On the latter, she oversaw a suite of policies that led to an unprecedented steep drop in deforestation in the Amazon after 2005 (see Figure 1) . Like other successful environmental policies, this result derived from policies aimed at conservation in its own right along with nongovernmental initiatives like transnational consumer boycotts of products grown on deforested land that motivated agriculturalists to join the effort to protect their markets (Arima et al. 2015; Boucher, Roquemore, and Fitzhugh 2013; Gibbs, et al. 2015; Schwartzman, Moutinho, and Hamburg 2012) . Recognizing the weakness of the writing a didactic text on how to form an environmental movement (Minc 1985) . In an interview he granted while minister, he reminisced about how his approach to air pollution had shifted from shoving potatoes into the exhaust pipes of trucks to more (Abers and Oliveira 2015: 22) . Unlike her predecessors, Teixeira has more readily followed her president's policies, and the amount of overt conflict between the Ministry of Environment and other ministries has dropped. Civil society, in contrast, feels excluded. Protesters shouted over her presentation at the Rio+20 conference and she shouted back at them, in a moment that showed the divide. Ministério Público to try to work out strategies to create development that was both economically and environmentally sustainable. Dilma Rousseff, then Lula's Minister of Mines and Energy, was a key participant. As president, she later used the Situation Room set-up routinely to work through the gargalos or bottlenecks to the PAC (Program for 8 While there has been surprising little study of this process, it evidently introduces additional pork dimensions -but generally following local rather than presidential calculations. licensing. In this way, some of the tools that have made the Ministry of Environment and its licensing agency more independent of, and even antagonistic to, the executive's porkled coalition management strategies have become duller.
Conclusion
As scholars of presidentialism would expect, Brazilian environmental policy and outcomes did change quite a bit between the three presidential administrations from 2003
to2014. An innovative and very successful policy to control deforestation was weakened, especially with the presidential transition between Lula and Rousseff, and the results show in a leveling off of the drop in deforestation that had lasted eight years. Even between Lula's two terms, his decision to reorient his government to favor large infrastructure and energy projects in his second term brought changes. Many of these changes associated with presidential visions took place through successive choices of Ministers of the Environment who had steadily weaker ties with environmental activists over the three administrations.
The importance of pork for coalitional presidentialism showed up in all three administrations, as all were marked by significant conflict over the environmental licensing process. Regulations were steadily revised to reduce the ability of the Ministry of Environment, environmental activists, and the Ministério Público to block these important facilitators of coalition building (and personal and partisan enrichment, as the Lava Jato corruption trials show). At the same time, the environmental policy area does show some independence from presidents and coalitional presidentialism due to the countervailing pressures and resources of non-state actors.
Global comparative studies would miss many of these changes. EIA might have been weakened and accelerated, but it continued to exist as a regulation that was comparatively strong in international terms. The innovative deforestation policies did not go away and would still be counted in a comparative study; they just had less resources and (so far) still control deforestation in ways that Brazil historically could not. In many ways, this close view of Brazil and the more distant view of the comparative studies show the opposite virtues of qualitative and quantitative policy studies. The qualitative case study does show important historical variations, but they are still of less amplitude than the difference between, say, the forest policies of Brazil, Russia, and the Congo. Both of those views are important -and coalitional presidentialism appears to help account for the Brazilian modulations.
